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THE REINCORPORATION QUANDARY UNDER







The refrain most frequently repeated through the history of
federal revenue acts and internal revenue codes is that an event ought
to be taxed according to its substance rather than its form. Al-
though the theme is apparent in the decisions of the Tax Court and the
Ninth Circuit in Moffatt v. Commissioner,' its tones are noticeably
strained. Moffatt causes us to focus sharply on whether the Commis-
sioner may be almost foreclosed, under the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954,2 from piercing many forms of corporate
liquidations and reincorporations that, in substance, merely perpetuate
going enterprises.
As its two-part name suggests, the simplest form of liquidation-
reincorporation is the movement of the business out of one corporation
and into another with little or no disturbance of the activities or owner-
ship of the business. Sometimes the transaction is not tax-motivated and
is merely a convenient means of altering the capital structure of a
business, or allowing the owners to avail themselves of more favor-
able or progressive corporate laws in other states. Such liquidation-
reincorporation cases thus involve a succession of two corporations that
have the same business activities and are owned by the same persons in
the same proportions. The tax substance of the transaction is that a
reorganization has occurred, which, under section 368(a)(1)(D) of the
Code, causes no tax liability or change of basis at either the corporate
or shareholder level.
The goal of the tax-motivated liquidation-reincorporation, on the
other hand, is typically to accomplish a distribution of corporate earn-
t Member of the Massachusetts Bar. A.B. 1964, Princeton University; LL.B. 1967,
Harvard University.
1 42 T.C. 558 (1964), aff'd, 863 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 886 U.S. 1016
(1967).
2 Unless otherwise noted, all textual references to section numbers and the "Code"
relate to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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ings at capital gains rates without disturbing the activities or owner-
ship of the business enterprise. With this objective in mind, the tax
planner will devise a plan that invokes the principles of the liquida-
tion provisions of the Code and, independently, of the incorpora-
tion provisions. The advantages of having the steps of such a transaction
taxed independently are obvious. Any distribution of earnings will have
been achieved as part of the liquidation, and will be taxed as a capital
gain. Reorganization treatment, which is benign in a transaction that is
not tax-motivated, is a peril that the planner hopes to avoid, since any
distribution under a reorganization characterization of the transaction
would be treated as "boot" and probably taxed as an ordinary dividend.3
The tax-motivated transaction evidences an attempt to slip through
what may be a significant gap in the Code by distributing accumulated
corporate earnings to shareholders at capital gains rather than ordinary
income rates. This article is an analysis of some forms of the tax-
motivated liquidation-reincorporation-hereinafter "reincorporation"
-and an examination of the apparent gap in sections 368(a)(1)(D) and
354(b)(1) of the Code.
Typically, the first step in a tax-motivated reincorporation is the
distribution to shareholders of liquidating dividends, which the tax
planner hopes will be taxable at capital gains rates under section
331 (a). Theseliquidating dividends may consist of any combination of
distributions-in-kind and distributions of the proceeds from sales of
property at the corporate level.4 The second element of the reincorpora-
tion involves the return to cQrporate solution of only those assets
necessary to the operation of the business ("operating assets") and the
retention by the shareholders of nonoperating and liquid assets. The
tax planner again hopes that the transfer of these operating assets to a
second corporation owned by the same shareholders in the same pro-
portions will be a section 351 incorporation with no resulting tax at
either level.
The forms of transactions similar to these adhere closely to the
most detailed provisions of the liquidation and corporation organiza-
tion sections. Yet, in most cases, the substance of the transaction is
merely the payment of an ordinary corporate dividend by a continuing
enterprise. Although such a dividend should be taxed as ordinary
income, the Code provisions often seem inadequate to cover the more
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356(a)(g).
4 Neither the corporate sale and distribution of the proceeds thereof nor the distribu-
tion of property in kind need result in taxable gain to the corporation. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 336-37.
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ingenious forms of reincorporation. Thus, the transactions can result
in an ordinary dividend taxed to the shareholder at capital gains rates,
a stepped-up basis of corporate assets, and a complete obliteration of the
prior accumulated earnings and profits record of the corporation.
Neither the 1939 Code nor the present Code contains any pro-
vision purporting to deal explicitly with the reincorporation problem.
Thus, except as culled from various corporate tax sections, there are
no clear statutory standards for determining when a series of trans-
actions ought to be recharacterized for tax purposes. 5 That is, the
Code does not establish any criteria for distinguishing liquidation-
reincorporation transactions that ought to be characterized as continua-
tions of an enterprise from those that ought to be taxed as two separate
transactions. 6 Under the 1939 Code, most reincorporation transactions
were easily disposed of under section 112(g)(1)(D), which provided:
The term "reorganization" means... (D) a transfer by a corpo-
ration of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if im-
mediately after the transfer the transferor or its shareholders or
both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are trans-
ferred ....
This definition armed the Commissioner with language that covered
almost all transactions between commonly-owned corporations that
satisfied the eighty percent control test of section 112(h).8
The draftsmen of the 1954 Code, however, in their obvious pre-
occupation with divisive reorganizations, 9 altered the definition of the
"D reorganization."' 1 This had the unintended result of significantly
limiting the utility of the provision in the reincorporation area. Thus,
section 368(a)(1)(D) recognizes a reincorporation as a reorganization
"only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation
G The Commissioner's brief in opposition to the taxpayers' petition for certiorari in
Moffatt reveals a vague attempt to identify the reincorporation norm. Consideration is
limited to the distribution, however, and no mention is made of other tax consequences
that will result from reorganization rather than liquidation treatment. In sum, the argu-
ment reveals little more than an instinctive feeling that these particular distributions ought
to be taxed at ordinary income rates. Brief for Respondent on Petition for Certiorari at
4-5, Moffatt v. Commissioner, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967).
6 See R.M. Simon Trust v. United States, 7 CGH 1967 STAND. FED. TAx REP.
8184 (Ct. Cl.) (Report of Trial Comm'r).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g)(1)(D), as amended, -ch. 247, 53 Stat. 870 (1939).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(h), 53 Stat. 40. See discussion of reincorporation
cases under the 1939 Code at pp. 581-85 infra.
9 See note 37 infra, and discussion of legislative history of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 368(a)(1)(D), 354 and 355, pp. 585-89 infra.
10 References by the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F are to the provisions of INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1) or, where noted, to corresponding provisions of Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g)(1), 53 Stat. 40.
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to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which
qualifies under section 354, 355, or 856 ... ." And the transaction fits
within section 354(b)(1)(A) only when "the corporation to which the
assets are transferred acquires substantially all of the assets of the trans-
feror of such assets .... ."' An obvious problem of interpretation must
be faced. When the shareholders in a reincorporation case retain
property that is, in substance, only the payment of a large dividend,
has the surviving (transferee) corporation acquired less than "substan-
tially all" of the assets of the transferor? If this question is answered in
the affirmative, D would appear to be a useless provision for recharacter-
izing the most blatant reincorporations of continuing businesses.
Using the Moffatt case as a point of departure, this article deals first
with the extent to which the D reorganization definition-particularly
the "substantially all" phrase of section 354-can reasonably be con-
strued to cover various liquidations and reincorporations that should
be taxed as continuations of single enterprises. By the nature of the
inquiry, of course, some light must be shed upon whether any given
transaction should be recharacterized. Thus, this analysis should yield
some identification and evaluation of relevant factoxs-ih reincorporation
transactions that should be considered in construing sections 368(a)(1)
(D) and 854(b)(1) and that ought to be included in any future legislative
ventures into the reincorporation area.
B. The Moffatt Opinions
Moffatt & Nichol, Inc. ("M&N"), was primarily engaged in providing
architect-engineer services under consulting engineering contracts. 12
M&N employed approximately sixty-seven people during 1957, the
last year of its active existence, of whom one-third were "professional
people" and the balance sub-professional or draftsmen. Most of the
corporation's contracts were acquired through the personal efforts of its
two major shareholders, each of whom owned forty-five percent of the
outstanding stock. M&N had substantial earnings throughout its corpo-
rate life, but had paid only one dividend of $30,000. By the end of 1957,
the corporation had undistributed earnings and profits of approxi-
mately $200,000.
In the latter part of 1957, and pursuant to a plan that was intended
to respond to certain tax problems of the major shareholders, Moffatt
11 (Emphasis added.) Sections 355 and 356 are not relevant in this context.
12 Unless otherwise noted, facts reported are from the opinion of the Tax Court,
Moffatt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 558 (1964), aft'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1016 (1967).
[Vol. 53:575
REINCORPORATION QUANDARY
& Nichol, Engineers (hereinafter "Engineers") was organized with the
same principal place of business as M&N. Whereas M&N had capital
stock in the amount of $10,000, Engineers issued 25,000 shares of one
dollar par common stock. Initially, there was a new shareholder in Engi-
neers, but he sold his stock within five months of the issue, and Engi-
neers was owned thereafter in the same proportions as was M&N. The
shareholders paid for their stock in Engineers by means of personal
loans from M&N.
In October 1957 M&-N ceased active operations, and all its em-
ployees were transferred to the books of Engineers. Pending contracts
were not formally assigned, but all work required under them was per-
formed by Engineers under a plan of compensation from M&N. Furni-
ture and equipment used in the business were leased by M&N to
Engineers at "depreciation plus ten percent."
In December 1958 MgcN's board of directors adopted a resolution
to liquidate and dissolve the corporation. A complex series of trans-
actions followed involving: (1) loans of money by M&N to Engineers,
(2) "liquidating dividends" to M&N shareholders, consisting of cash,
land, equipment, furniture, etc., (3) loans of cash to Engineers by M&N
and by the shareholders, and (4) transfers of assets by the shareholders to
Engineers in exchange for Engineers' common stock and debt instru-
ments. In 1960 M&N made its final liquidating dividend. By 1961 all
equipment and furniture except one automobile had found its way
from M&N through the shareholders to Engineers. Similarly, Engineers
acquired sufficient cash with which to operate by means of a conglomera-
tion of loans and capital contributions.
One major "asset" owned by M&N and distributed to its share-
holders was never brought *ithin Engineers' corporate form. 3 Early in
1957 .M&N had purchased a parcel of land intending to construct a
building on it for use in the business. By the end of that year, $72,000
had been accumulated in an informal building reserve, but the project
was abandoned because of adverse business conditions. Although the
land was, by reference to its cost basis, a "substantial asset" on the cor-
porate balance sheet,14 it had never actually been used in relation to the
business. At the time of its distribution to the shareholders on December
13 "[Ajpart from a very few minor items the only asset of magnitude that did not wind
up in the hands of the new company was the vacant real estate and the building plans re-
lating thereto." 42 T.C. at 581.
14 A composite balance sheet of M&N for the years 1957-59 was set out by the court.
42 T.C. at 561. As is typical in the case of a service corporation, the balance sheet is an




81, 1959, the land had a book value in excess of $75,QO and a fair
market value of almost $85,000.15
The shareholders treated the distributions received during 1958,
1959, and 1960 as long term capital gains under sections 331 and 346.
The Commissioner asserted a deficiency, claiming that the transactions
were all included in an integrated plan of reorganization under sections
368(a)(1)(D) and 354(b), and that the distributions were taxable, to
the extent of gain, at ordinary income rates as "boot" under section
356(a)(1). 16 Both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Engineers, as the transferee corporation, had acquired "substantially
all of the assets" of M&cN in compliance with section 354(b)(1)(A).
The taxpayers argued that, since the land was never transferred to
Engineers, the surviving corporation had not acquired "substantially
all" of M&=N's assets. This argument, based on the percentage of total
assets transferred, 17 was rejected by both courts on what appear to be
two distinct grounds. First, the courts considered the term "assets" to
include such non-balance sheet items as "good will" and the staff of
trained employees, which were transferred to Engineers. Second, as
used in section 354, the courts deemed "assets" to relate only to the
operating assets of the business enterprise.
In the setting of a service organization such as a consulting en-
gineering operation, the retention of physical non-operating assets
such as land should not cloud the fact that the essential tangible
and intangible assets of one corporation have been transferred to
another corporation.'8
Judge Craig, dissenting in the court of appeals, unequivocally
disagreed with the statutory interpretation of "substantially all." He
argued that if Congress had intended to limit the transfer to "operating
assets" it would have said so; the court should not read the requirement
15 42 T.C. at 569. The book value of the land included approximately $15,000 spent
by the corporation on building plans.
16 The earnings and profits of Mg:N were sufficient to cover these distributions.
17 Since this article is more a general analysis of the D reorganization in the rein-
corporation area than a detailed examination of the Moffatt decisions in particular, it is
unnecessary to play percentage bingo with the taxpayers and courts. Suffice it to say
that the Ninth Circuit admitted that the land constituted 35A8% of the "book assets."
363 F.d at 267, There was to attempt in either opinion to compute the fair market value
of all items on the balance sheet, though it was mentioned that the value of the land had
appreciated.
18 363 F.2d at 267-68. Since the courts made no attempt to value the intangible assets,
it is unclear whether they would have been willing to base an opinion solely on the in-
tangible asset rationale. If, however, the "operating assets" concept is a sound one, it




into the Code. Second, though the demarcation line of "substantially
all" need not be fixed accurately, it certainly is somewhere above
64.52 percent. Third, the record disclosed that neither company con-
sidered "good will" to be an asset, and the court should be fore-
closed from considering this factor in determining the value of the
assets transferred. Fourth, while Congress may be presumed to have
exercised its taxing power to the fullest, that presumption does not
authorize the court to supply additional language to the act.19
The Moffatt courts go to great lengths to expound a definition of
"substantially all" that will bring the taxpayers within the literal lan-
guage of the D reorganization provisions. But there is little considera-
tion given the broader ramifications of the reorganization-liquidation
problem. By analyzing the transactions in such a narrow fashion, the
courts provide almost no guidelines for when the extraordinary Moffatt
definition of "substantially all" is to be invoked,2 0
II
GENEALOGY OF THE D REEOnGANIZATION IN TFIE
REINCORXP'OlTiON AREA
A. The D Reorganization Under the 1939 Code
Though section 112(g)(1)(D) of the 1939 Code2' ultimately became
the Commissioner's prime weapon for taxing reincorporation distribu-
tions at ordinary income rates,22 its effectiveness is not immediately
19 Id. at 270 (dissenting opinion). The dissent also argued that a loan ig not a g 354
"transfer." Id. at 270-71. This contention will not be examined, since it seems to be a
"substahce-form" distfinction that carries little persuasive force. Cf. james Armour, Inc.,
43 T.C. 295 (1964).
20 Both courts in Moffatt intuited the tax to be imposed on the distributions in ques-
don, and then wrote opinions embodying that predetermined outcome. Unfortunately, the
holding of the case has implications far broader than the taxation of these particular
distributions. Although there is language referring to "continuity of enterprise," 42 T.C.
at 578, the opinions contain no detailed examination of the precise relationship of this
concept to a transfer of "substantially all of the assets."
21 The text of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g)(1)(D), 53 Stat. 870 is set out at
p. 577 supra.
22 The operative section for taxing such distributions was Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 112(c), 53 Stat. 39:
GAIN FROM EXCHANGES NOT SOLELY IN KIND-
(I) If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (b) . . . (3)
[providing for non-reeognition of gain to the hareholder on an exchange of stock
or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization solely for stock or securi-
ties in such corporation, or in another corporation a party to the reorgafnization]
... if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not
only of property permitted by such paragraph to be received without the
1968]
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obvious from the statutory language. A general review of the cases
reveals a judicial gloss of section 112(g)(1)(D) that dosed many of the
potential tax loopholes.
23
When a reincorporation was accomplished without any inter-
corporate dealings, the taxpayers sought to avoid the impact of re-
organization treatment by arguing that there had been no "transfer"
by a corporation to a controlled corporation. Alternatively, they argued
that there was no "plan of reorganization," particularly when the birth
of the surviving corporation occurred after the liquidation and dissolu-
tion of the original corporation.24 These arguments were usually dis-
posed of by finding that the shareholders served merely as a conduit
for the transfer of assets from one corporation to the other.25 Similarly,
most courts rejected the argument that a formal "plan" was required,
and did not allow taxpayers to avoid D reorganization treatment by a
premeditated failure to adopt a formal "plan." In any event, courts
tended to infer the existence of a "plan" from the series of transactions
involved.26
In another common argument taxpayers invoked the "business
purpose" doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering.27 This doctrine was orig-
inally formulated to prevent the taxpayer from avoiding tax in a trans-
action that literally qualified for reorganization treatment. But obvi-
recognition of gain, but also of other property or money, then the gain, if any,
to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum
of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
(2) If a distribution made in pursuance of a plan of reorganization is within
the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection but has the effect of the dis-
tribution of a taxable dividend, then there shall be taxed as a dividend to each
distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not
in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the
corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the
gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be taxed as a gain from the exchange
of property.
23 To the extent that INT. Rxv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 354, 356, and 368(a)(1)(D) adopt the
language of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 112(b)(3), (c), and (g)(1)(D), 53 Stat. 37, 39,
870, the statutory construction announced by the pre-1954 cases is still crucial.
24 Formal adoption of the plan by each corporation participating in the reorganiza-
tion is still required by Treas. Reg. § 1.368-3(a) (1955), but this regulation now seems to
be generally ignored by both the courts and the Commissioner. But see United States v.
Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953).
25 Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), affg 5 T.C. 665 (1945).
Accord, Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 906 (1955) (decided under the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(b)(4), 45 Stat. 816).
26 William M. Liddon, 22 T.C. 1220, 1225 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 230 F.2d
304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956); Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162
F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), aftg 5 T.C. 665 (1945). Contra, United States v. Arcade Co., 203
F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); R.M. Simon Trust v. United States,
7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 8184 (Ct. Cl.) (Report of Trial Comm'r).
27 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
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ously taxpayers could not be allowed to invert Gregory and thereby
"bootstrap" themselves out of ordinary income taxation by claiming
that the reincorporation was motivated solely by the individual share-
holders and had no corporate business purpose. Although the courts
do not always deal candidly with this argument, they consistently reject
the most ingenious uses of Gregory by taxpayers.
28
In light, of this development,29 the least that can be said of the
1939 version of the D reorganization is that it adequately dealt with
most reincorporation problems.8 0 Perhaps the experience under the
1939 Code should have led the draftsmen of the 1954 Code to recognize
the semantic difficulties with the D reorganization and to provide the
Commissioner with a statute better suited to reincorporation problems.
But the legislative gears of the Eighty-third Congress methodically
ground out a narrowly-worded statute-the scheme of sections 354 and
368(a)(1)(D)-that appeared to blunt the Commissioner's most potent
reincorporation weapon.
The 1939 provisions certainly were not perfect for dealing with
reincorporation situations, and thus required some change. Though
sufficient to deal with reincorporation cases, the statutory language was
too broad. Admittedly, it is often desirable for the Commissioner to
retain flexibility, and reincorporation may be an appropriate area for
such flexibility. But flexibility should be granted in statutory terms that
allow reviewing courts to exercise some degree of discipline. Since the
language of the 1939 D scheme nowhere referred by name to rein-
corporation, there seemed to be no statutory barriers (except the "con-
trol" requirement and "plan" concept) restricting the Commissioner's
use of the section to those reincorporation cases that ought to have
been treated as continuations of the same business. Thus, virtually any
transfer of assets between "controlled" corporations fell within the
28 Thus, the Eighth Circuit ini Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir.
1947), interprets Gregory and distinguishes the taxpayer's case. A slightly more palatable
approach is adopted in Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649-50 (Ist Cir. 1949), in
which Judge Magruder notes that any "business purpose" argument attempting to sepa-
rate "corporation" and "shareholders" is totally unrealistic in the close corporation cases.
The Lewis rationale may be more honest intellectually, but it is difficult to castigate a
court that is less candid. Though Gregory is generally accepted, it is extremely difficult to
articulate the result in terms that clearly exclude the taxpayers' attempted uses of the
doctrine in reincorporation situations.
29 This "sketch" of pre-1954 cases is intended only as a cursory sampling of the D
cases under the 1939 Code. The attempt is merely to delineate very generally the scope of
the 1939 D, to contrast it with that of the 1954 D, and to utilize both in the ultimate search
for a more desirable approach to reincorporation.
80 Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, in 3 TAx REVISION CoaPE~mum, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1619 (House Comm. on Ways and Means, Comm. Print 1959).
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language of the statute. The Commissioner was able to assert a tax
merely by showing that the form of a particular transaction satisfied
the D description, and he was rarely obliged to sustain a rigorous sub-
stantive argument that a particular transaction ought to be taxed as
the reincorporation of a going business.
The decision in Ernest F. Bechers1 illustrates the problem under
the 1939 provisions. Becher owned 72A8 percent of the outstanding
stock of a corporation engaged in the manufacture of sponge rubber
and canvas products. After the termination of World War II virtually
eliminated the corporation's raison d'etre, Becher individually investi-
gated other opportunities, and finally settled on the upholstered furni-
ture business. For various business reasons it was decided to organize a
new corporation through a series of transactions that happened to be
covered by the language of sections 112(b)(3), (c), and (g)(l)(D) of the
1939 Code. Though little of the equipment or furniture of the original
corporation could have been used in the furniture business, some of it,
together with the building in which the original business had been
conducted, was transferred to the surviving corporation in exchange for
stock in that corporation. This stock was then distributed pro rata,
though subsequent intershareholder transactions resulted in Becher's
ownership of approximately eighty-six percent of the stock and in the
elimination of one substantial shareholder.
The original corporation transferred only twenty-five percent of
its book assets to the surviving corporation and retained the balance to
discharge its liabilities. The major purposes of the transfer were to get
cash into the new corporation and to aid the original corporation in its
liquidation. Of the tangible assets, only the building was retained by
the new corporation. The decision to retain the building was reached
only after repeated attempts to sell it ended in failure. Extensive
alterations were necessary to render it useful in the furniture busi-
ness.$2
The Commissioner's target in Becher was a final "liquidating
dividend" of $149,000 distributed by the original corporation. The
Tax Court found "literal compliance with section (g)(1)(D)," 33 but it
did not stop there.
31 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955). Facts summarized are from
the opinion of the Tax Court.
32 The building had been fully depreciated in the hands of the original corporation
and had been carried on the books at zero. 22 T.C. at 936.
3, Id. at 940. After holding that there was a D reorganization, the Tax Court pro-
ceeded to tax the distribution as a dividend under § 115(g) while holding that there had
been no "boot.' under § 112(c). Id. at 943. In affirming the result, the Second Circuit dis-
agreed with the Tax Court on this point and held § 112(c) applicable. 221 F.2d at 254.
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[The taxpayer shareholders] contend, however, that there is no re-
organization where, as in the instart case, the assets were acquired
by the transferee corporation with the purpose of carrying on by the
new corporation of a business of manufacturing a product different
from that manufactured by the predecessor. In our opinion, section
112(g) [(1) (D)] cannot be so narrowly construed.34
In affirming the Tax Court on this point, the Second Circuit pur-
ported to analyze the transaction under the "business purpose" doctrine.
[T]he Tax Court here correctly held that a business purpose does
not require an identity of business before and after the reorganiza-
tion. Thus the fact that [the new corporation's]... products are not
the same as [the old corporation's] . . . products is irrelevant.85
Thus, the Becher courts were able to tax the transactions as a
reincorporation of a business enterprise without any in-depth analysis
of whether the case involved a true reincorporation. Since there
was literal compliance with the statute, the courts didnot.have- to
analyze the "continuity" problems. Nor did they reach such difficult
questions as whether the earnings and profits record of a corporation
ought to survive in an entirely new business venture involving essen-
tially the same shareholders. Becher thus suggests that even the most
questionable reincorporation cases were, under the 1939 D provision,
virtually immune from thoughtful judicial scrutiny.
B. The Fate of the Reincorporation Doctrine in the Eighty-third
Congress and After
The heights of inadvertence and carelessness displayed by the
House and Senate in their 1954 treatment of reincorporation as-
sume the heroic proportions of a true modern tragedy. The original
bill in the House of Representatives included a section aimed directly
at the reincorporation problem:
Sec. 857. Liquidation Followed by Reincorporation.
(a) General Rule.-In any case in which one or more indi-
viduals receive assets in a complete or partial liquidation... from
a corporation controlled by such individual or individuals and with-
in 5 years from the date of the final distribution in such liquidation
transfer more than 50 percent of such assets (other than money and
stock or securities (other than stock or securities representing an
interest in the distributing corporation)) to one or more corpora-
tions controlled by one or more of such individuals in a transaction
to which section 351 is applicable-
(1) the corporation to which any of such assets have been
84 22 T.C. At 940.
85 221 F.2d at 253.
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transferred shall be deemed to have received such assets from the
liquidating corporation pursuant to [the analogue of a C re-
organization] ... ; and
(2) an amount equal to the fair market value of the assets
received in liquidation not so transferred shall be deemed to have
been received by the individuals in control of such other corpora-
tion or corporations as a distribution [pursuant to a reorganiza-
tion] . 6...a6
The section went on to define "control" as fifty percent of the total
combined voting power or fifty percent of the total value of all shares
outstanding. There was also a subsection providing that section 357
was not applicable when the taxpayer established that tax avoidance
was not one of the principal purposes of the transactions.
The comments accompanying proposed section 357 indicated that
the draftsmen had a deep understanding of the particular problems in
the reincorporation and related corporate tax areas. The stated desire
was that concrete definitions be blended with flexible terminology in
such a manner as to insure that transactions accomplishing substantially
the same result be taxed alike no matter what their forms, and that
taxpayers be afforded some degree of certainty in planning their
actions 7
The proposed House reincorporation provision marked a signifi-
cant shift in focus from the 1939 Code. Most important, section 357 dealt
with the transaction by describing its end result rather than the pro-
cedure used to achieve that result. If successful, this would have reduced
the number of form-substance squabbles between the Commissioner
and taxpayers. Second, since reincorporation was dealt with in a separate
section, special attention was called to those considerations of tax-
avoidance that are unique to the area. Unfortunately, the present defi-
nitions of "reorganization" in section 368 imply that all reorganizations,
because they share a common name, should be analyzed in the same
terms. Such an effect is attested to in Moffatt, where the courts attempt
to use constructions of "substantially all" in the C context as precedent
for interpreting "substantially all" in D. But a typical C reorganization
is a combination of corporate enterprises under different ownership 8
on the model of a merger. A D reorganization (as well as some C's and
most E's and F's) admits of fewer merger analogies, particularly in a
Moffatt situation where the surviving corporation has no previous busi-
56 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 357 (1954).
37 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1954).
38 "Different ownership" is a relative term, with the legislative line drawn by § 368(c)
at 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and 80%
of the total number of shares of all other dasses of stock of the corporation.
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ness'of its own. By citing C cases in Moffatt, the courts, without recog-
nizing the problem explicitly, injected themselves into a maddening
paradox. In merger-type C cases, where it is generally the taxpayer who
argues for "tax-free" reorganization treatment, the cases properly with-
hold this legislative favor from him if he withdraws too much property
from the corporation. In D reorganizations, it is usually the Commis-
sioner who argues for reorganization so that distributions by a continu-
ing enterprise'will be taxed at ordinary income rates. Thus, C treatment
is most proper in those corporate combination cases in which the
distribution is smallest, and D is most proper in those continuing
enterprise cases in which the distribution is largest 9 Though this
analysis may be somewhat imprecise, it points out a possible ground
for preferring the arrangement of provisions in the proposed House
bill over the arrangements in both the 1939 and 1954 Codes.
Unfortunately, in dosing some potential loopholes, proposed sec-
tion 357 invited new techniques for avoiding taxation. Though the
attempt to provide certainty for taxpayers is often a laudable legis-
lative objective, it may not be particularly apt in the reincorporation
area. The fifty-percent-of-assets test is certainly an arbitrary cut-off and
indicates a certain unwillingness to depart from the ill-founded notion
that business essence and identity are always related to tangible prop-
erty. Thus, though section 357 might stop a Becher court from reaching
an improper result, it could similarly preclude a Moffatt-oriented court
from reaching a proper one.40 Finally, the standards of control con-
tinuity in the fifty percent and eighty percent tests are not very appro-
priate means for identifying tax-avoidance situations.
Whatever the relative merits and faults of section 857 may have
been, the Senate appears to have rejected it out of hand. Indeed, it is
difficult to find evidence suggesting that the Senate was other than in-
different to the entire reincorporation problem. Seeming to ignore the
reincorporation impact of the "substantially all" clause of section 354,
the report accompanying the Senate revision erroneously asserted that
section 368(a)(1)(D) "restates the definition of existing law appearing
in section 112(g)(1)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939." 41 The
39 The point concerning the large distribution in a D reorganization is a subtle one.
There is a very fine line between a distribution properly viewed as a large "dividend"
pursuant to a reincorporation, and a distribution so large that there is insufficient con-
tinuity of the business enterprise for the transaction to constitute a reincorporation.
('Distribution," as used in this footnote, refers to only those assets that are not returned
to the corporate form.)
40 If Mqffatt reaches the proper result on the existing facts, it is at least arguable that
the result should remain unchanged in the case where the land was much more valuable.
41 S. R . No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954).
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same report again pleasingly reassured the Senate that, except for divi-
sive reorganizations, the reorganization provisions "are the same as
under existing law and are stated in substantially the same form."42
In acquiescing to this arch-bungle of the Senate, the conferees
for the House issued a statement that hardly reveals their earlier in-
terest in certainty and fairness. In a now famous passage, the House
conferees added insult to the injury perpetrated by the Senate.
Liquidation followed by reincorporation.- The House bill in
section 357 contained a provision dealing with a device whereby it
has been attempted to withdraw corporate earnings at capital gains
rates by distributing all the assets of a corporation in complete
liquidation and promptly reinicorporating the business assets. This
provision gave rise to certain technical problems and it has not
been retained in the bill as recommended by the accompanying
conference report. It is the belief of the managers on the part of the
House that, at the present time, the possibility of tax avoidance
in this area is not sufficiently serious to require a special statutory
provision. It is believed that this possibility can appropriately be
disposed of by judicial decision or by regulation within the frame-
work of the other provisions of the bill.43
Great caution must be taken in drawing inferences from the Com-
missioner's response to the above invitation to deal with reincorpo-
ration problems by regulation. It is significant, however, that the
Commissioner's initial instinct was to promulgate regulations under
sections other than 368(a)(1)(D). Thus, in Joseph C. Gallagher44 the
Commissioner argued, inter alia, that, even if there was no statutory
reorganization, a "liquidation" did not in substance occur when assets
were returned to corporate solution.4"
Referring to sections 301 and 356 in Treasury Regulation
1.331-1(c),46 the Commissioner argued for "reorganization" treatment
of transactions that did not qualify under section 368 but had similar
results.47 Though this argument has received favorable comment,48 it
42 Id. at 265.
43 H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d SesS. 41 (1954).
44 39 T.C. 144 (1962), acquiesced in, 1964-2 Cum. BuL.. 5.
45 Treas. Reg. g 1.331-1(c) (1955):
A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another corporation of all
or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation or which is preceded by such
a transfer may, however, have the effect of the distribution of a dividend or of a
transaction in which no loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the ex-
tent of "other property." See sections 301 and 356.
46 Quoted in note 45 supra.
47 An analogous argument by a taxpayer in the context of a B reorganization was
rejected in Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1960), aff1'd, 368 U.S.
337 (1961).
48 Cf. Grubb, Corporate Manipulations Under Subchapter C: Reincorporation-Liqui-
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was unsuccessful in Gallagher, where the court characterized the reor-
ganization prQvisions as the exclusive technique for imposing ordinary
income taxation on distributions pursuant to liquidation-reincorpora-
tions.4 9 The regulation indicates a possible admission by the Commis-
sioner that the D reorganization provisions do not reach the hard cases
of reincorporation. 50 Prior to the Moffatt reading of section 354, com-
mentators were generally in accord on this view and pleaded for
legislative action. 51
In December, 1957, the "Subchapter C Advisory Group" proposed
amendments to the Code to deal with the reincorporation problem.
These proposals became a House bill in 1959, but were never enacted
into law.52 Basically, they sought to work within the existing framework
of the Code and concentrated on eliminating the "substantially all" re-
quirement. Though the language of the proposals was elaborate, it
would have accomplished little more than a return to the non-norma-
tive structure of the 1939 Code. No serious attempt is made here to
interpret Congress's failure to enact the 1959 amendments. Possibly
the 1954 dream that the Code dealt adequately with reincorporation
was still believed. More likely, the potential impact of "substantially
all" in section 354 was still not appreciated. But then Moffatt appeared,
and the fabled "seamless web" of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
threatened to burst from the stress on the language of section 354(b)(1)
(A).
III
Ti LIMrTS OF "SUBSTANTIALLY ALL"
A. Analysis of the Moffatt Interpretation
Much of the disagreement over the Moffatt reasoning can be viewed
as .problem in statutory interpretation. Generally, Congress evaluates
dation, 28 U. Cmn. L. REv. 304, 326-27 (1959). Contra, Commissioner v. Berghash, 361
F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1966).
49 39 T.C. at 160. Accord, R.M. Simon Trust v. United States, 7 CCH 1967
STAND. Fa. TAx REP. 8184 (Ct. C1.) (Report of Trial Comm'r). For a thoughtful anal-
ysis of Gallagher, see Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really
Chaniged?, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1218 (1964).
50 The D reorganization was argued by the Commissioner in Gallagher, but the case
failed to satisfy the 80% control requirement. 39 T.C. at 161.
51 Bauman, New Clouds on the Liquidation Horizon, 48 A.B.A.J. 182, 184 (1962)
(taking the view that the IRS had abandoned D in the reincorporation area); Grubb,
supra note 48, at 321-22 (aTguing that D would not apply where liquid assets in
excess of 20% were retained and distributed to shareholders); Kuhn, Liquidation and
Reincorporation Under the 1954 Code, 51 GCo. Lj. 96, 112-13 (1962); MacLean, Problems
of Reincorporation and Related Proposals of the $ubchapter C Advisory Group, 13 TAX
L. REv. 407, 414 (1958).
52 H.R. REP. No. 4459, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 19, 26 (1959) (proposed amendments
of INT. RFV. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 354, 368 respectively).
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the subject matter of a proposed statute and decides whether justice
can best be served through elaborate, detailed, self-defining provisions
or through broadly worded provisions that give greater flexibility.
The D reorganization in the reincorporation area poses a serious di-
lemma. Sections 368, 354, 355, 356, 381, etc., constitute an extremely
detailed statutory scheme. But since the D provision, as it applies to
reincorporation, is meant to stifle tax evasion, it should be drafted to
allow maximum flexibility.53 The problem remains whether a judicial
determination that the D provision should admit great flexibility allows
a court virtually to ignore the specificity of the statute.
Any ambiguity inherent in the words "substantially all of the
assets" is not extremely troublesome. Though each of the key words
can be supplied with various definitional nuances, none cries out for
interpretation. "Assets" generally means property owned by a corpo-
ration. "Substantially all" means all but an insignificant portion. The
thrust of the Moffatt dissent is that, when words have a well-settled
meaning in common parlance, they ought to be understood precisely
as written. This argument has particular force where, as in Moffatt, the
courts insert words ("operating or business assets" for "assets") that are
also in common usage and could have been included in the statute
explicitly.54 Thus, the dissent refuses to look to underlying policy and
seems to consider the terminology of section 354 to be firmly rooted
and utterly static.55
The Moffatt construction of "substantially all" is not strongly
53 This flexibility is not needed as much in the A, B, and C provisions, since D is the
Commissioner's main weapon for attacking liquidation-reincorporations and treating them
as reorganizations with resulting dividend treatment of boot. Of course, in some cases the
Commissioner might argue in favor of a C reorganization and resulting dividend treatment
of boot, and thus C also might require some flexibility. Where a taxpayer attempts to
employ INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 368, as a shield to the recognition of gain, there can be
no particular objection to requiring him to follow pre-determined forms; thus, a rigid
provision is justified. But where the reorganization provisions are designed to be used as
a Commissioner's sword, the provisions in question ought to be drafted so as to be useful
on a case-by-case basis. Despite the functional distinctions between the typical C and D
reorganizations, the tone and content of the language in A through D is uniform. The
problem created by this draftsmanship is similar to that discussed at pp. 586-87 supra.
54 Cf. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954), quoted at p. 588 supra, in
which the term "business assets" is used.
55 This purely linguistic approach must be ascribed to the dissent in view of the
citation to precedent that has no substantive relationship to Moffatt. Frederick A. Dudderar,
44 T.C. 632 (1965), cited for its discussion of "substantially all," deals with the question
whether the payment of 73% of premiums for a life insurance contract constitutes a pay-
ment of "substantially all" under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(b)(1). Moffatt v. Commis-
sioner, 363 F.2d 262, 270 n,2 (9th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967). See also Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 152 (1933).
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suppbrted by legislative intent. Statements made by the House con-
ferees50 express an intent to deal with reincorporation cases, but no
direct reference is made to any sections deemed relevant. On the other
hand, the belief expressed on behalf of the Senate that the D reorgani-
zation stated the same law as under the 1939 Code57 does imply that the
draftsmen intended the D provision to cover reincorporation cases.
Thus, the Congressional reports and the statute itself yield conflicting
inferences concerning the intent of Congress. After the Gallagher de-
cision rejecting the Commissioner's proposed alternatives for dealing
with reincorporation, however, even the statutory purist ought not to
rebel when some play is imported into the 368-354 scheme in order
to close what would otherwise be a gigantic tax loophole.
If D is to be rendered a useful provision by judicial interpretation,
it must be carefully dissected. Two closely related lines of inquiry and
precedent seem involved, though the Moffatt courts did not perceive
the difference in any detail. First, what does "substantially all" mean?
Second, what are "assets"?r s
"Substantially all" is the easier term to deal with. Even assuming
that Moffatt's limitation to "operating assets" is correct, how should
"substantially all" be construed? In computing a percentage of assets,
it seems clearly preferable to use fair market value rather than book
value.59 The concern should be with some manifestation of the earning
potential of particular assets.60 Adjusted book value figures, though
they purport to value the useful life remaining in assets, are too
capricious.
Since the ultimate reincorporation inquiry should be directed to
56 H. R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). See also Pridemark, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1965).
57 See pp. 587-88 & notes 41-42 supra.
58 It is understood that the attempt to separate "substantially all of the assets" into
parts is a bit artificial, but it can be useful. The mode of analysis followed here is first to
assess the quantitative flexibility in "substantially all" aside from any consideration of the
nature of the particular assets transferred or retained. Independent analysis is not always
possible, since the most difficult and illuminating cases must be decided in terms of both
the quantity and the nature of the assets.
59 Authorities adhering to book value are R. & J. Furniture Co., 20 T.C. 857, 865
(1953), rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1955), and Arctic Ice Mach. Co.,
23 B.T.A. 1223, 1228 (1931), modified mem., 67 F.2d 983 (1933). Authorities adhering to
fair market value are Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262, 269 (9th Cir. 1966) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967), Schuh Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 95
F.2d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 1938), and Richard K. Mellon, 12 T.C. 90, 109 (1949), aff'd, 184
F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1950); Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966 INT. REV. BULL. No. 34, at 22.
60 See Book Prod. Indus., Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 339, 350 (1965). Although




a determination of when a corporation is a reincarnation of another
corporation, and since section 354(b)(1) dictates that this inquiry be
made in terms of "assets," the ideal analysis would be to define "sub,
stantially all" in terms of value of "assets" to the corporate business in
question. Under this theory, the "value" of the vacant land in Moffatt
would be zero. Such analysis involves reasoning similar to that indulged
in by the Moffatt courts in attempting to define the "business" and to
distinguish between business and nonbusiness assets. It does not, how-
ever, reach the question whether intangibles are to be included in the
word "assets." As is the problem with so many "ideal" approaches, this
mode of valuation is likely to be difficult for courts to handle; but it is
not impossible. "Value to the corporate business" could provide courts
with a useful guideline, even when it cannot be reduced to concrete
numbers.
After a decision to use fair market value rather than book value,
the next inquiry concerns the weight to be accorded the liabilities of
the original corporation. There are two lines of authority on the ques-
tion whether liabilities can be considered at all, the majority view being
that liabilities are at least relevant. 61 The ability to consider offsetting
liabilities might be valuable to the Commissioner, particularly in deal-
ing with transactions in which a portion of the operating assets are-not
transferred. Where seventy-five percent of operating assets are trans-
ferred, a distinction might be made between cases in which the remain-
ing twenty-five percent are distributed to shareholders, and those in
which the twenty-five percent are used to pay off liabilities. Although
perhaps neither of these situations ought to be covered by section 354,
the second case would be an easier one for the Commissioner.6 2 Never-
61 The following require consideration of gross assets only: Virginia Stevedoring
Corp., 30 T.C. 996, 1007 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1959) (questions of
qualification as a "purchasing corporation" under § 474(a)(1)(A) of the Int. Rev. Code of
1939, added by ch. 521, 65 Stat. 558 (1951); cf. Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966 Int. Rev. Bull. No.
34, at 22, where, for purposes of issuing a ruling letter, INT. RyV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 354(b)(1)(A) will ordinarily be deemed satisfied if there is a transfer of 90% of net
assets and 70% of gross assets (fair market value).
The following consider net assets: Western Indus. Co. v. Helvering, 82 F.2d 461, 464
(D.C. Cir. 1936); National Bank of Commerce v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 887, 895 (E.D.
Va. 1958); Faigle Tool & Die Corp., 7 T.C. 236, 243 (1946); Milton Smith, 34 B.T.A. 702,
705 (1936); Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 253; Grubb, supra note 48, at 321-22 n.65;
Lane, supra note 49, at 1249.
Cases dealing with liabilities in C reorganizations are relevant to definition of "sub-
stantially all" in a D context, but the distinctions between the two provisions must be
kept in mind.
62 These hypothetical cases are discussed in greater detail at pp. 598-99 infra. It may-
be noted briefly, however, that it is not entirely clear that the "substance" of case 1 is
merely the payment of an ordinary dividend, since such a distribution made by a single
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theless, it is difficult to state a general rule concerning liabilities. They
should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, with reference to the under-
lying policy of reincorporation,
Whether the properties transferred constitute "substantially all"
is a matter to be determined from the facts and circumstances in
each case rather than by the application of any particular percent-
age. It might well be . . . that if a corporation having gross assets
of $1,000,000 and liabilities of $900,000 transferred only the net
assets of $100,000 the result would not come within the intent of
Congress in its use of the words "substantially all," 63
In considering the word "assets," the force of precedent is less dear.
The C reorganization provisions in the 1939 and 1954 Codes speak in
terms of substantially all of the "properties," which is also the word
used in the "substantially all" context of pre-1989 revenue acts.6 4
The D counterpart in statutes prior to the 1954 "substantially all"
proviso has traditionally spoken of a transfer of "assets" rather than
property.65 Section 368(a)(1)(D) adopts the "assets" terminology, but a
curious distinction is made in section 354(b). Section 354(b)(1)(A) re-
quires the transferee corporation to acquire "substantially all of the
assets of the transferor. . . ." Section 854(b)(1)(B) adds the requirement
that "properties" retained or received by the transferor be distributed.
Again the traditional tools of statutory construction are strained.
Congress 'probably was not trying to express any meaningful distinction
between the definitions of "properties" and "assets." Assuming, how-
ever, that "properties" means ."all of the property of the corporation,"
and that "assets" has the more limited meaning of "operating or busi-
ness assets," then use of these definitions in section 354(b) explains, even
requires, the result in Moffatt.
Although this formulation yields the desirable result, it is un-
acceptable. First, there is no indication in the legislative history of the
C-ode that such contrasting definitions were ever considered. Second,
"assets" and "properties" have always been used interchangeably by
the courts, leaving little authority supporting the distinction." Third,
continuing operation might quality for capital gains treatment under INT. RaV CODE OF
1954, § 831, as a § 346 partial liquidation.
63 Milton Smith, 34 B.T.A. 702, 705 (1986). Accord, B. BnTrxmt & J. EusncE, FEDFRAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 527-29 (2d ed. 1966).
64 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i)(1)(A), 45 Stat. 818: "The term
.reorganization' means (A) a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one
corporation of ... substantially all the properties of another corporation) ..
65 E.g., id. § 112(i)(1)(B).
66 A few courts have attempted to dispose of cases by the "word definition" approach,
but, curiously, these cases have argued that "properties" should be narrowly defined as
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if any difference between these terms had been intended, it would
undoubtedly have been embodied in a definitional section.6 7 Fourth, if
the Commissioner urged that "properties" in D was a very broad term
as opposed to "assets," it is difficult to foresee how this argument could
be reconciled with the interpretation of "properties" in C, used in other
circumstances to mean operating assets.68
A more acceptable use of the difference between C's "substantially
all of the properties" and D's "substantially all of the assets" is as a
point of emphasis that the phrases are not to be construed identically.
This proposition lends statutory support to allowing varying degrees
of substantive flexibility in the D phrase and in the C phrase. Accord-
ing this significance to the difference in wording justifies the use of
different standards when the Commissioner, rather than the taxpayer,
is arguing in favor of "reorganization." 69 Thus, C cases construing "sub-
stantially all" should not be dispositive in a D situation.70
Moffatt should not have limited its inquiry to "operating assets."
It is always important to determine whether all of the operating assets
have in fact been transferred, but such a determination cannot conclude
a court's inquiry under the language of the present statute. Considera-
tion of the nature of assets not transferred is somewhat helpful, but
only in cases at the outer limits of what has traditionally been under-
stood to constitute "substantially all." Passing the question whether in-
tangibles are to be considered, section 354 seemingly should not be
stretched to cover the case where only thirty percent of net assets are
transferred, even if this thirty percent includes one hundred percent
of the so-called "operating assets." 7' If such a transaction should be
"business properties." Gross v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1937). But see
C.T. Ini,. Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 583, 584 (8th Cir. 1937).
67 Petitioner [taxpayer] contends that substantially all its "properties," means
substantially all its physical "operating" properties. We believe no such limitation
can be placed on the word "properties." The word must be taken in its ordinary
sense ... . If Congress had intended to restrict the meaning of the word, it
would have done so.
Pillar Rock Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1937).
68 Commissioner v. First Nat'l Bank, 104 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 1939), appeal dismissed,
309 U.S. 691 (1940); Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 Cumr. BULL. 253. Significantly, however, at
page 255 of this ruling "assets" and "properties" are used interchangeably.
69 A contrary position has, however, been taken:
Our determination of the substantive question must not be controlled by whether
in the particular case it is to the advantage of the government or of the taxpayer
to make out that no statutory reorganization has been effected.
Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 648 (1st Cir. 1949).
70 But see B. BiTa-R & J. EusTicE, supra note 63, at 535 n.68, expressing surprise that
the D phrase has been interpreted more liberally than the C phrase.
71 Rommer v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 740, 744 (D.N.J. 1966).
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treated as a reincorporation, then legislative action shifting the statu-
tory emphasis away from "assets" is clearly necessary.
The Moffatt result can better be justified under the statute by in-
clusion of intangibles within the term "assets." The reasoning set out
above for not using book value in considering "substantially all" is
equally germane to whether "assets" ought to be limited to those shown
on the corporation's tax balance sheet.72 Thus, whether or not "good
will" or a "staff of skilled employees" have a tax basis that would justify
their presence on the balance sheet is irrelevant to the D inquiry.
Furthermore, if reference is made to the common usage of the word
"assets," inclusion of admittedly valuable, though intangible, "prop-
erty" does not strain the language significantly.
There is persuasive authority in the cases supporting consideration
of a corporation's intangibles in analyzing "substantially all."
73 Of
course, if intangibles are considered, section 354 should oblige a court
to indulge in some sort of valuation process. This is suggested as a
means of controlling decisions and forcing courts to justify their results
in terms of the statute. A decision written in the sweeping terms of
Moffatt may reflect nothing more than the traditional judicial distrust
of any complex tax planning that culminates in a distribution to
shareholders.
Though the proposed method of analysis regarding intangibles
and operating assets probably would not change the result in Moffatt,
it dearly possesses more than academic significance. In attempting to
delineate the "essence" or identity of a business enterprise for purposes
of determining whether that "essence" has been continued in a suc-
ceeding business entity, and in being forced by the statute to define a
corporate identity in terms of "assets," a court certainly would accord
some weight to property that is of substantial value in proportion to
the total worth of the corporation. In Moffatt the value of the vacant
land was equal to thirty-five percent of the total assets. Though owner-
ship of the land did not constitute an "active business" as that term is
used in section 355,74 and though a distribution of the land probably
would not have qualified for capital gains treatment as a partial liqui-
72 See pp. 591-92 supra.
73 Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 40 T.C. 744 (1963). Though it was not a reincorporation
case, and although the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that all the non-balance
sheet assets were transferred, the opinion clearly evinces a willingness to consider in-
tangibles in deciding whether the latter of two successive entities has acquired "sub-
stantially all" of the properties of the former and therefore represents a continuation of a
single enterprise.
74 See Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1963).
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dation under sections 346 and 33 1,75 the land is, under section 354, an
important element of the corporate identity, perhaps because of its size
alone. Though a better reincorporation statute would expressly cover
this case, section 354 requires measurement of the corporate "essence"
on an "assets" yardstick. Thus, labeling the land as a "nonbusiness
asset" begs the question of section 354, i.e., what is the "corporate
business"?
Post-Moffatt experience supplies at least two poignant examples of
this question-begging. Retail Properties, Inc.7 6 involved a corporation
that owned five parcels of improved rental property in addition to all
the stock of its Canadian subsidiary engaged in the same busifiess. One
of the five parcels was sold to a third party for $250,000, and the re-
maining four parcels were transferred to the subsidiary for cash, ten-
year notes, and assumption of the mortgage and nonmortgage liabili-
ties. The corporation then distributed all assets, including the Canadian
stock, within twelve months of the shareholder resolution to liquidate,
The taxpayer argued that the subsidiary did not acquire "sub-
stantially all of the assets," since it received land with a net value of
$643,000 and did not acquire its own stock worth $800,000.77 The
court properly rejected this contention, but its reasoning has disastrous
implications. The court could easily have reached its result by holding
that the exchange of all the stock in return for an issuance of new stock
would have been a meaningless ritual, and that the failure to have in-
dulged in such a formality did not defeat D reorganization treatment. 7
But the court chose instead to "follow" Moffatt by stating that the five
parcels of land were the sole operating assets of the corporation, and
that the stock was a nonoperating asset.79 Suppose, however, that the'
corporation had owned fifty percent of the stock of a corporation con-
ducting a rental business, and that it had exchanged the land for stock
in a wholly-owned subsidiary, distributing stock in its subsidiary to-
gether with rental corporation stock to its shareholders. The language
of Retail Properties would require the improper conclusion that "Sub-
stantially all of the assets" had been transferred. Because of its value
75 See Johnson-McReynolds Chevrolet Corp., 27 TC. 300, 303 (1936). But see Samuel
A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120, 1127 (1945).
76 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1463 (1964). The case involved taxation not of shareholders
but of a foreign corporation that was a party to a D reorganization under INT, Rxv. CODE
oF 1954, § 867.
77 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1472,
78 Commissioner v. Morgan, 288 F,2d 676, 680 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836
(1961); James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 307 (1964). Cf. Helvering v. Schoellkopf, 100 F.2d
415, 416-17 (2d Cir. 1938).
79 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1472.
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and nature the "investment" in the rental corporation would begin to
look very much like an operating asset, regardless of whether it is
presently producing income.
In Ralph C. Wilson, Sr.,80 the Moffatt formula yielded a result
that is, indeed, difficult to justify under section 354. The court found
a D reorganization on the ground that the parties had used a liquida-
tion-reincorporation scheme to attempt to withdraw corporate earnings
at capital gains rates.81 Though there is much discussion of valuable
non-balance-sheet assets and transfer of the "entire business," the court
paid curiopsly little attention to stock owned in a transit company and
not transferred to the successor corporation. The cost basis of this stock
accoun-rd-for almost half the book assets, and, by the time of distribu-
tion, its total value had doubled to $280,000. More important, however,
dividends from the stock accounted for almost twenty percent of gross
income and almost twenty-seven percent of income before taxes (as-
suming that no expenses were allocated to this income).82 Even if the
substantial value of an asset does not alone require that Moffatt's anal-
ysis of section 354 include it, the fact that it generates a significant
portion of the corporate income suggests that it should be characterized
as an "operating asset." 88 But any reasonable definition of "operating
assets" would not include passive, though productive, investments.
Thus, the better conclusion to be drawn from Wilson is that there are
some cases in which all of a corporation's operating assets ought not to
be deemed "substantially all of the assets" of that corporation.
The construction of section 354 urged above would reject the
Moffatt approach in part, and thereby render the statutory D reorga-
nization an inadequate approach to the problem of reincorporation.
But even the expansive statutory interpretations of sections 368 and
354 supplied in the Moffatt opinions leave much of the reincorporation
area beyond the limits of the D provision. Nevertheless, the questions
considered above are all matters of close construction, and it is to be
expected that courts will occasionally wink at the statutory language
in order to reach an obviously desirable result.
80 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
81 Id. at 348-50,
82 Id. at 337-39.
83 See, e.g., Book Prod. Indus., Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 339 (1965), an F reorganiza-
tion case, in which the Commissioner argued that there had been a transfer of the
"essential assets of the business," though only three of six properties owned by the corpora-
tion were transferred. The court rejected the Commissioner's attempt to characterize the
business by reference to these three properties by noting that they generated only 35%
of the gross realty rentals. Id. at 550.
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B. The Case Proving D's Inadequacy
Before ringing the death knell of the D "substantially all" require-
ment, it is necessary to d.efine the elements of those transactions that
should be taxed as reincorporations of business enterprises, i.e., the
reincorporation norm.84 Though difficult to reach under the present D
scheme, Moffatt is an easy case when matched against the vague stan-
dards that comprise the reincorporation norm. The Moffatt judges had
an unarticulated intuition of the tax results that should have flowed
from the transactions in question. Even before defining the reincorpo-
ration norm, it is clear that the judges' intuitions were sound. But, as
we have seen, intuition is a less dependable guide in a situation like
Becher.8 5
Normally, the taxpayer in a reincorporation case is the individual
shareholder fighting for capital gains treatment of a distribution. With "
the immediate issues before the court limited to seemingly unique
distributions, decisions uniformly fail to consider more difficult ques-
tions that will arise, if at all, in the future. There is little judicial
sympathy in reincorporation cases for the taxpayer who has received a
dividend that admittedly represents earnings and profits. The Becher
court, however, probably would not have been so quick to find a rein-
corporation if the question had been whether the succeeding furniture
business should have been burdened with the accumulated earnings
and profits of the defunct rubber business.
Assume the Moffatt facts with the following variations: (1) the
corporation had owned the land for ten years and had constructed a
building on it that was used in the business; (2) in the shift of opera-
tions to Engineers, it was decided that the business income no longer
warranted use of this building and its fixtures, and it was distributed
to the shareholders; (3) the building had a value equal to twenty-five
percent of the fair market value of the total assets; and (4) the decision
not to use the building was motivated by a gradual decrease in business.
Assume substantively that, if M&N had continued in existence and
distributed the building to its shareholders, the distribution would have
been taxed at capital gains rates under sections 346(a)(2) and 331 (a)(2).8 6
Looking only at how the distribution would have been taxed absent
the manipulation of corporate forms leads to the conclusion that this
84 Since this article is limited to consideration of the D reorganization in the rein-
corporation area, the reincorporation norm is formulated with the assumption that other
provisions in the Code remain in effect.
85 See pp. 584-85 supra.
86 This assumption of a legal conclusion is requested merely so that this type of
problem can be examined in conjunction with the familiar facts of Moffatt.
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distribution should not be taxed at ordinary income rates and, there-
fore, that there is no reincorporation. 7 But such a result, though fair to
the individual shareholder, allows the corporation to wipe its earnings
and profits slate dean and to step up its basis in its assets in a transaction
that is, in substance, only a partial liquidation of a going concern. If,
on the other hand, this transaction is held to be a D reorganization,
the distributee is taxed unfairly.
In the hypothetical case, it is extremely doubtful that a court could
find under section 354 that there had been a transfer of substantially
all of the assets when, in the corresponding 346 action, it would have
found a "genuine contraction of the corporate business."18 8 Under the
construction of section 354 suggested earlier, a court could find a D
reorganizaton only if the value of such distributed assets were ex-
tredhlely small.More likely, however, a finding of hypothetical qualifica-
tion under section 346 would preclude a holding under 354 that sub-
stantially all of the assets had been acquired by the transferee.
The tax planner can thus frustrate the applicability of the D reor-
ganization 89 in the following reincorporation transaction. Corporation
X has accumulated earnings and profits of one million dollars. The
corporation genuinely decides to contract its business. All assets (in-
cluding cash) are then distributed to X's shareholders in complete
liquidation of X corporation. Assuming a not unusual dose corporation
case where X's shareholders represent the original investors, the capital
gain at the shareholder level will be in an amount approximately equal
to the accumulated earnings of the corporation plus theretofore un-
realized appreciation, if any, in the value of the corporate assets. The
shareholders' bases in the assets would be equal to the fair market value
of those assets at the time of distribution.0° The shareholders would
then retain any assets that would have been distributed in a theoretical
partial liquidation plus any excess cash not required to operate the con-
tracted business and would transfer the balance of the assets to a new
corporation Y in exchange for stock in that corporation. This transfer
would be a section 351 transaction and Y corporation would hold all
assets with tax bases equal to fair market value. Shareholders would
have this same fair market value basis in their stock. There has been
87 See, e.g., note 5 supra.
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.346-1(a)(2) (1955).
89 No implications regarding the possible use of E or F reorganizations are in-
tended. But if these provisions are now stretched to apply, the need for an explidt re-
incorporation provision, rather than a mere revision of the D provisions, is further
emphasized. See p. 590 &- note 53 supra.
90 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 334(a).
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no D reorganization; not only have corporate earnings been distributed
at capital gains rates, but also Y corporation has earnings and profits
equal to zero. Except for a contraction that was assumedly desirable,
the business activities and ownership have continued uninterrupted.
Though the standards of section 346 provide illuminating ex-
amples of cases outside of "substantially all," this hypothetical partial
liquidation by no means represents the least amount of assets that must
be withdrawn in order to avoid the D reorganization. In algebraic
terms, an entire business minus a genuine contraction is less than sub-
stantially all of the assets. This formula holds true under Moffatt's
broad interpretation of 354, as well as under the interpretation proposed
in this article, since partial liquidation usually involves operating assets.
IV
CONCLUSIONS: DREAMS OF A NEW STATUTE
The D reorganization provisions in sections 368 and 354 are ill-
suited to deal with the problems posed in the liquidation-reincorpora-
tion area. The broad interpretation of section 354 that allowed the
Moffatt courts to reach desirable results in that case seems to do un-
justifiable violence to the language of the statute. This criticism of the
D reorganization, however, extends beyond the restrictive language of
the 1954 version of that provision, and is aimed at the 1939 statute as
well. The reincorporation problem is somewhat unique in the corpo-
rate area and is not properly dealt with merely as another form of "reor-
ganization." Forcing reincorporation into the reorganization mold
invites the use of reorganization precedent that is sometimes irrelevant.
Once reincorporation is deemed by Congress to be worthy of its own
section, courts will be able to adopt a more candid approach, preferably
under a statute in which language and policy will coincide more neatly
than they do in the present scheme.
The definitional section of any proposed legislation in the rein-
corporation area should be phrased in terms of the'results sought to be
covered. Arguably, some firm legislative decision concerning "control"
should be expressed. Assuming that the present eighty percent control
requirement is sound, it is an area in which flexibility would add very
little. There should also be some legislative judgment clarifying n-
tinuity of, the business enterprise."9' 1 Continuity of business and con-
tinuity-of ownership interest go hand in hand in all reorganization
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
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theory. Reincorporation treatment, however, should become operative
only where continuity of business is so extreme that it can truly be
said that the same corporation is continuing and that a distribution at
capital gains rates or a step-up in corporate basis would amount to an
evasion.
Decided cases and Revenue Rulings are not in accord with the
view that a transaction is deemed an evasive reincorporation only when
essentially the same business activity is continued.9 2 The language in
the cases unequivocally states that a similar business is not required as
long as the surviving corporation engages in some business activity.
93
The results of most of the cases, however, can be explained without
reference to the purported substantive grounds of decision, since the
fact situations precisely fit the non-normative Code definitions.94 This
is the problem discussed earlier in the Becher context, where it was
found that the expansive, non-normative language of the D definition
did not force courts to make carefully considered decisions on the true
nature of reincorporations. 95
The reincorporation problem is thus reduced to the case in which
essentially the "same business"-a very flexible concept not avoided by
insignificant formal variations-is continued under essentially the
same ownership (eighty percent). This includes the situation in which
one of two businesses in a single corporation is liquidated permanently
and the other continued. Such standards should be articulated clearly
92 E.g., Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363, 367 (S.D. Tex, 1961); Ernest F. Becher,
22 T.C. 932, 940-41 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1968-1 Cum.
BuLL. 77.
3 Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363, 367 (S.D, Tex. 1961),
94 Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Tex. 1961) is a hard case to deal with,
since the facts in the opinion are unclear. It appears that there were three D reorganiza-
tions (three family corporations into a single new corporation), each involving a transfer of
all assets. Since the surviving corporation carried on an entirely new business, one cannot
tell what happened to these assets. Nevertheless, there is dear compliance with INT.
Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(D) and 354(a)(1).
Though there is a significant question concerning the court's integration of 1926 and
1938 transactions in Morley Cypress Trust, 3 T.C. 84 (1944), both it and Ernest F. Becher,
22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955), are easy cases under the pre-1954 D
provision, since there was a transfer of assets to a controlled corporation.
Rev. Rul 63-29, 1963-1 Cn . BuLL. 77, may be correct. The situation is a C reorganiza-
tion in which only the business of the acquired corporation was continued and the
business of the acquiring corporation was terminated. Thus, it is only the acquired corpora-
tion and its shareholders that are exchanging stock, and a finding of discontinuity of
business as to them resulting in a tax would be patently unfair. Unfortunately, this
ruling revoked Rev. Rul. 56-330, 1956-2 Cuo. BuLL. 204, though that ruling (holding that
there was insufficient continuity of business in the Bentsen fact situation) seems clearly
correct and distinguishable.
95 See p. 585 supra.
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in any new statute in order to overrule the Becher result. Becher seems
to tax the shareholders merely because of their continued relationship to
each other; but the Code nowhere suggests that this is an incident of
taxation. Thus, two stockholders owning all stock in a restaurant should
be able to terminate that investment and secure capital gains treatment
under section 331 even when they simultaneously start a new corpo-
ration engaged in the manufacture of paper dips. The taxation of the
distribution should not be different when it happens that the restaurant
building can be converted into a paper dip factory.96 Theories of de-
predation are, however, more difficult to reconcile with the stepped-up
basis of old assets in the new corporation, since the benefit of double
deductions would accrue to the same individual stockholders despite
the nature of the business. Some of these considerations are at least
partially offset by the recapture provisions of sections 1245 and 1250.
On balance, however, it would be preferable to provide for a carry-over
basis in all cases in which there is "continuity of ownership" arid in
which depreciable assets are returned to corporate solution. This
result should apply whether or not there has been a true "reincorpora-
tion" of the business. The theory is similar to that expressed in section
334(b), where, on liquidation of an eighty percent owned subsidiary,
the parent takes the assets at the subsidiary's basis unless the parent
has acquired its interest in the subsidiary through a purchase for value
rather than the mere issuance of "paper" stock.97
Versatility of the operative taxing section of a new statute would
be as important as simplicity and flexibility in the definition. Since the
ideal definition would make it clear that the provision applies only in
cases in which a going business continued, all taxes should be imposed
without regard to any of the "forms" of the reincorporation. Thus, an
exchange of'common stock should not be viewed as an exchange at all.
Distributions that look like dividends should be taxed as dividends.98
Distributions that are partial liquidations should be taxed consistently
with the liquidation sections. Basis in assets and the record of earnings
and profits would be continued. When a reincorporation has occurred,
96 This is, of course, a simplified statement of Becher.
97 Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1239.
98 The § 356 technique for taxing distributions of "boot" only to the extent of gain
is not very meaningful in the reincorporation area. The proposed "dividend" taxation
would be assessed on only the net amount retained by the shareholder to the extent
covered by earnings and profits, with any excess applied against basis in stock. Cf. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c)(2). The tax in Moffatt seems incorrect in the sense that the
distribution subjected to tax includes assets that are returned to corporate solution.
See Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 824 (1956).
See note 13 supra for the assets in Moffatt that were returned to corporate solution.
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the substance of all transactions should be ta~ced under existing sections
of the Code as though a single corporation had, in fact, continued in
existence 99
Of course, the task of writing a new statute in this area is far more
difficult than the above comments would suggest. For example, section
354 cannot simply be removed from the Code, since it serves an im-
portant function in funnelling divisive reorganizations into section 355.
Overlap with such sections as 351 should also be clarified. Nevertheless,
the approach sketched above would allow the Commissioner maximum
flexibility in attacking reincorporations in more relevant terms than
are required at present.
Moffatt v. Commissioner is an extremely significant reincorpora-
tion case, since the deciding judges were forced to engage in faulty
construction of a poorly drafted statute in order to reach the proper
result. One cannot imagine a more ardent plea for legislative reform.
99 Whete the surviving corporation was engaged in a separate business prior to the
reincorporation, the rules of INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 381-82 would apply.
